Abstract Alternative proofs for Guaspari and Solovay's completeness theorems for R are presented. R is an extension of the provability logic L and was developed in order to study the formal properties of the provability predicate of PA occurring in sentences that may contain connectives for witness comparison. (The primary example of sentences involving witness comparison is the Rosser sentence.) In this article the proof of the Kripke model completeness theorems employs tail models, as introduced by Visser, instead of the more usual finite Kripke models. The use of tail models makes it possible to derive arithmetical completeness from Kripke model completeness by literally embedding Kripke models into PA. Our arithmetical completeness theorem differs slightly from the one proved by Guaspari and Solovay, and it also forms a solution to the problem (advanced by Smoryήski) of obtaining a completeness result with respect to a variety of orderings.
Introduction
This paper deals with the completeness proofs given in [2] for the theory R, which is an extension of the provability logic L introduced in [5] . R is formulated in a language containing < and < as connectives for witness comparison, which enables one to study the provability predicate as it occurs in formulas like Pr( Γ A n ) < Pr( r £ n ), defined as 3x(Proof(x, Γ^π ) Λ Vy < x -iProoff.y,'"/?' 1 )). Rosser sentences are good examples of this kind of formula. In Section 1 we describe the theories L and R and the alternative complete-*The treatment of the Kripke model completeness theorem given in Section 2 has benefited much from [3] . Albert Visser's suggestions, corrections and remarks also made a substantial contribution to this paper. ness proofs for L given by Visser. Our main object is to give similar alternative proofs for R. Sections 2 and 3 deal with the Kripke model, and arithmetical, completeness proofs, respectively.
Only elementary facts from modal logic and PA are used. Formally, no knowledge of provability logic is presupposed. For background knowledge, see [1] or the more up-to-date and up-tempo [4] . For that matter, the original articles referred to above are highly readable themselves. Some of the details omitted in this paper can be found in [10] .
1 The theories L and R For convenience we summarize Solovay's completeness theorems from [5] and give definitions of some relevant notions.
Definition
L is the following theory in <£, the language of propositional modal logic (A,B,... denote well-formed formulas of <£):
Axioms: Boolean tautologies Ώ(A-+B)-+ (ΠA-+ ΏB) ΠA-> UUA Π{ΠA^>A)-* UA Rules: modus ponens
A/ΠA.
(Some other names for this system found in the literature are PrL, G, and GL.) finite, transitive, irreflexive (tree-ordered) Kripke models.
Theorem (Kripke model completeness) For any sentence A of <£: L h A iff A is valid in all finite, transitive, irreflexive (tree-ordered) Kripke models iff A holds at the root of all

Definition
An arithmetical interpretation * of £ is a map from formulas of £ to sentences of PA satisfying: for all atomic p: p* is an arithmetical sentence ± = 0 = 1; T* = 0 = 0 ( ) * commutes with Boolean connectives (UA)* = Pr( r A*~]).
Theorem (Arithmetical completeness) For any sentence A of £: L V A iff for all* (PA h A*).
In other words, L axiomatizes the schemata provable about the provability predicate Pr(x) in PA. We also have a system L ω which axiomatizes the true schemata about Pr(x):
Definition
L ω is the following system of modal logic:
Axioms: All theorems of L UA^A Rules: modus ponens.
Theorem
For any sentence A of £: L ω h A iff for all* A* is true.
Let S(A) = [B:ΠB is a subformula of A}. Since L ω h A iff L ĥ (ΠB -+ B) -+ A, we also have a Kripke model completeness theorem
for L ω .
Definition
An A-sound Kripke model is a Kripke model whose root satisfies /j/\ (ΠB^B).
BeS(Ά)
Theorem
For any sentence A of £: L ω h A iff A is forced at the root of all A-sound, finite, transitive, irreflexive (tree-ordered) Kripke models.
The proof of the arithmetical completeness of L exploits the Kripke model completeness by "embedding" finite Kripke models "into PA": If L \tA, then we can find an interpretation * based on a countermodel of A such that PA 1/ A*.
To justify the use of the phrase "embedding into PA" one would like to have a representation [A] κ of the set of nodes of the Kripke model K in which A is forced such that
where * is an arithmetical interpretation based on K.
However, this is impossible for finite Kripke models K, since for such models there exists an n such that Π n ± and D Λ+1 J_ are forced at the same (viz. all) nodes. But then (2) yields:
which is a contradiction. In [8] the notion of tail model is introduced and it is shown that these tail models are really "embeddable into PA" in the above sense. Roughly, a tail model is a finite, transitive, irreflexive, tree-ordered Kripke model with an ω + 1-tail attached to its bottom node, where the forcing of atomic formulas is defined constant on the tail (see Section 2 for an exact definition).
Since a tail model is automatically A -sound for every A in £, we have the following alternative Kripke completeness theorem for L ω :
1.8' Theorem
For any sentence A of £: L ω \-A iff A is forced at the root of all tail models.
For a proof see [8] or the perhaps more accessible [9] . Tail models will be used extensively in the simplified arithmetical and Kripke model completeness proofs for the theories R and R ω , which will be described below.
Definition
The language <£ + is obtained from <£ by adding two (partial) connectives for witness comparison: < and <. We also have a new formation rule:
ΠA < ΏB and ΏA < ΏB are well-formed formulas whenever A and B are.
The Σ-formulas are those formulas of £ + which have <, <, or D as their principal connective. The boxed formulas are those formulas of <£ + which have D as their principal connective.
From now on A, B f C,... denote formulas of £ + .
R is the theory with the following rules and axioms:
Axioms: All schemas of L, for all <£
The particular set of order axioms above, which is taken from [3] , is somewhat simpler than but equivalent to the set given in [2] . It is easy to see that the order axioms say that < is a weak pre-ordering of the boxed formulas and that < is its associated strict pre-ordering, such that true formulas are witnessed before false ones and false formulas are totally unordered. Some of the following straightforward consequences of the order axioms will be used further on:
Here A, B, and C denote boxed formulas.
The theory obtained from R by deleting the rule ΏA/A is called R~.
R~ is used to simplify the Kripke model completeness proof for R, which is the theory of all schemata provable in PA. Again, as in the case of L, we have a theory R ω of all true schemata:
1.12 Definition R ω is the following theory:
Axioms: All Theorems of R (in fact, R~ would do) ΏA-+A Rules: modus ponens.
In [2] it is noted that deductions in R cannot be normalized, since R h DT<D1 and R~ V DT < D±, so any proof of DT < D± must use the rule ΠA/A. We will show that it is possible to replace the rule ΠA/A by a rule with the subformula property. (It remains an open question whether a variant of the system so obtained satisfies a normalization theorem.)
R' is the theory obtained from R by replacing the rule ΠA/A by the rule A/^B -> (ΠA < Π 2 B).
Theorem
Proof: "<=": Clearly it is sufficient to show that R' h ΏA implies R' h A. Suppose therefore that R' h ΠA, so for all formulas B,
The rule A/-*B -+ (ΠA < Π 2 B) is similar to a rule of the system Z in [6] , which results from R by replacing the axiom of Σ-soundness and the rule ΠA/A by A/-^B -> (ΠA < ΠB) and the axiom ΠA -• D (->£ -> (DΛ < D5)).
Kripke model completeness
For the reasons stated above we employ tail models instead of the more usual finite, transitive, irreflexive Kripke models.
Definition
A tail model for L is a transitive, irreflexive, tree-ordered Kripke model K = <ω,<,||->, which satisfies: the forcing relation | h satisfies the usual clauses and is defined for all formulas of <£ if m Φ 0, then 0 < m if n Φ 0 and n < m, then n > m for some TV =£ 0: (i) for all «, m > TV (n > m => n < m)
(ii) for n = 0 or n > TV: for all /?/ (nWpi^N \\-p^.
An TV which satisfies (i) and (ii) is called a tail-element. The subtree generated by a tail-element is called a to/? part. See Figure 1 for a representation of a typical tail model.
A tail model for R is a tail model for L which in addition satisfies: the forcing relation Ih is defined for all formulas of £ + the forcing of the witness comparison formulas is persistent, i.e.:
• model for R" and "finite Kripke tree" will mean "finite, transitive, irreflexive, tree-ordered Kripke model for R".
Tail Lemma
For every tail model K:
Proof: Easy induction on A. We'll show one case: "A = B < C". Suppose 0 Ih B < C. Then, by Σ-persistency, for all n, n | (-B < C. For the other direction, suppose for all n > M that n \\-B < C. Then for all n > M, n \\-B, so, by the induction hypothesis 0 Ih B. But then 0 Ih B < C or 0 Ih C < B. From 0 Ih C < B we derive by Σ-persistency: for all n y n Ih C < B, which is a contradiction. So
Next we'll list some straightforward definitions.
Definition
Let AT be a tail model. The depth d(n) of a node n is defined as follows:
Note: d(fl) = 1 if n is a top element of K and d(0) = ω. In general we have ά(n) = a iff n Ih Π a ± and n \\f Π β ± for all β < a, where D a ± is defined inductively by: i Ih UA < UB iff for some j < i, j Ih UA and j \\f UB i Ih UA < UB iff for ally < / (j \\-UB*=*j \\-UA) and / Ih UA.
A set of formulas S is called adequate if
For any formula A, S A denotes the smallest adequate set containing A.
A Kripke model restricted to a set S of formulas is a Kripke model for which the forcing relation is required to be defined only for formulas from S.
One easily derives the Kripke model completeness of R~ from that of L once one has proved the Extension Lemma below. This lemma says that, given a Kripke model <^,<,lh> restricted to an adequate set S, we can extend it to a Kripke model for R, i.e., we can define a forcing relation IK such that <JKΓ,<,IK> is a Kripke model (for R) and IK agrees with Ih on formulas from S.
In [4] the extension lemma is proved by induction on the complexity of formulas, i.e., on the number of nestings of new witness comparisons, where "new" means "not already in 5". The complexity c(A) of a formula A is defined, relative to S, as follows:
In [3] de Jongh introduced certain orderings of boxed formulas in nodes of a Kripke model which made it possible to define uniformly, for all n, an extension of the forcing relation on the set of formulas with complexity < n to the set of formulas with complexity < n + 1. We will show that it is in fact possible to incorporate the induction on the complexity of formulas into the definition of the extended forcing relation.
The de Jongh orderings < kth and <* t |_ and the de Jongh equivalence relation = kft are defined (relative to a Kripke model <^,<,lh» as follows: We will often write A < k B, A < k B, and A = k Bif it is clear from the context which forcing relation is relevant. It is a trivial exercise to show that < k and < k satisfy the order axioms and Σ-persistency.
The lemma below establishes the property of the de Jongh orderings which makes them useful: they correspond to the minimal structure imposed upon the forcing of boxed formulas by the requirements of a Kripke model for R.
Lemma Let < and < be orderings on the boxed formulas of an adequate set S which satisfy the order axioms and Σ-persistency on (K,< 9 \\-} restricted to S. Let ~k i ψ be the equivalence relation defined as follows:
A ~k th B^k\\-A<Bandk\\-B<Aork\\tAandkUB.
Then for allA,BeS the following hold:
(ii) Suppose k Ih A < B. Then k\\-A and for all k' < k (k f Ih B =* k' Ih A), for suppose for some k' < k that k' Ih B and k' \\t A, whence k' \\-B < A and, by Σ-persistency, k \\-B < A, which yields a contradiction.
(iii) follows directly from (ii).
Extension Lemma (i) A tail model restricted to an adequate set S can be extended to a tail model forR.
(ii) A finite Kripke tree restricted to an adequate set S can be extended to a finite Kripke tree for R.
Proof: (i) Let <^f,<,|h> be a tail model restricted to an adequate set S. Define a forcing relation II-' inductively as follows: Notice that our use of the de Jongh orderings relative to IK on the right is possible since A < ktV B and A < kj y B are defined whenever IK is defined on A and B.
It is easy to verify that IK extends Ih, that the forcing of witness comparison formulas is persistent, and that each instance of an order axiom is forced at each node. See below for an attempt to visualize the kind of ordering of boxed formulas the above definition of If-' produces.
The proof of (ii) is similar.
The rationale for the particular extension defined in the proof above can be extracted from the following considerations.
Suppose (K,< 9 \\-) is a tail model restricted to an adequate set S. If we want to extend Ih to a forcing relation IK defined on all formulas of <£ + , we have to choose which new comparison formulas are forced in which nodes, in such a way that the order axioms and Σ-persistency are satisfied. Σ-persistency is equivalent to the requirement that the choice of the order in k of boxed formulas which are forced in a node k' < k has to agree with the choice made in k'. From Lemma 2.8(i) it follows that if ΠA is forced in a node k' < k and there is no k' < k in which ΠB is forced, then IK has to satisfy k IK ΏA < ΠB. That means that we only have to choose, for each node k, the order of formulas within the = k ^-equivalence class F k of boxed formulas forced "for the first time" in k and the = k^-equivalence class N k of boxed formulas not forced in k.
In view of the meaning of the order axioms it is easy to see (though somewhat tedious to prove) that these axioms are satisfied iff in addition to Σ-persistency the following conditions hold for all k:
• ifAEN k , then k IK A < B and k \\f' A < B (this implies that all formulas (old and new) in N k are ^p-equivalent) (where •' represents a -3, II-' -equivalence class not containing any new formulas.) The proof of the Extension Lemma shows that this method can be realized by means of an inductive definition of the extended forcing relation which exploits the properties of the de Jongh orderings.
Theorem
For any sentence A of £ + , the following are equivalent:
(ϊ)R-\-A (ii) A is valid on all finite Kripke trees (iii) A holds at the root of every finite Kripke tree.
Proof: (i) => (ii) and (ii) => (iii) are obvious. To prove (iii) => (i), assume that R~ 1/ A. Let Z>o, ...,£>" be the formulas of S A with principal connective < or < and let p 0 ,... ,p n be distinct atoms of £ + not occurring in S A . For any B from S Ά , let B' be the formula in <£ such that B = B'[Di/p{\. Define X = {m (pj -> Upi): 0 </</!} U {Ξ2Γ : B is an order axiom involving only formulas oϊ S A }. Then L V tt\X-+A f . By Theorem 1.2, there is a finite, transitive, irreflexive (tree-ordered) Kripke model for L (K,< 9 \\-) such that /AXΛ -ΛA' is true at its root.
Define V on S A by k V B iff k\\-B', for any B from S A . Notice that /AX is actually valid on <AΓ,<,| | ->, so (K,<,\\-'} is a finite Kripke tree restricted to S A whose root satisfies ~^A. By the Extension Lemma (K,< 9 \\-'} can be extended to a finite Kripke tree whose root does not satisfy A.
The completeness proof for R is now very simple on account of the following lemma.
Lemma (de Jongh) R h A iff for some n G IN, R~ h DM.
Proof: From right to left: Apply the rule ΏA/A n times. For the other direction, apply induction to the length of the proof of A:
• For all axioms of R~ the result is trivial.
• (modus ponens) Assume that R h5 and R h B -> A. It is easy to see that, as remarked before, tail models and all their finite top parts are automatically A -sound for any formula A. The following lemma establishes that the validity of a formula A on all tail models is equivalent to the validity of A on all A -sound finite Kripke trees.
Prolongation Lemma (i) An A-sound finite Kripke tree restricted to S A on which A is not valid can be prolonged to a tail model on which A is not valid (ii) If A does not hold at the root of an A-sound finite Kripke tree restricted to S A , then there is a tail model whose root does not satisfy A.
Proof: (i) Suppose (K,<,\\-) is an ^4-sound finite Kripke tree restricted to S A . Attach an ω + 1-tail k m+u k m+2 ,... ,k 0 to the bottom k m of (K,<,\\-), while defining forcing for formulas from S A on elements of the tail exactly as on k m (this definition is possible by A-soundness). This results in a tail model restricted to S A on which A is not valid. By the Extension Lemma, this tail model can be extended to a tail model for R on which A is not valid,
(ii) Notice that in the proof above k 0 ¥ A if k m \\ί A.
Theorem (Kripke model completeness) (i) R h A iff A is valid in all tail models K (ii) R ω h A iff 0 Ih A for all tail models K.
Proof: (i) "if": Assume R \f A. Then by Lemma 2.11, for all n G IN, R" \f DM. In particular, R~ \f DM with n greater than the number of subformulas of A. By Theorem 2.10, there exists a finite Kripke tree K = (K,<,h) with bottom node k 0 on which DM is not valid. But then A is false at a node k n G K such that there is a chain k 0 < k\ < k 2 < ... < k n in K. a finite Kripke tree K = <ΛΓ,<,lh> such that the bottom node k of K satisfies k Ih ff\ (UB -* B) and k \\f A. By the Prolongation Lemma, K can be ex-
B^S(A)
tended to a tail model K' = <ω,<,|f-'> with 0 ψ A.
Remark
It follows from the proof of Theorem 2.13 that we may assume that the forcing of witness comparison formulas in a tail model is a primitive recursive function of nodes and boxed formulas, since if R \f A we can construct a tail model in which A is not valid as follows: (1) we start with a finite Kripke tree restricted to S A (2) we take the subtree generated by k m as specified in the proof of 2.13 (3) we prolong this subtree to a tail model.
Clearly (3) is the only step which might be problematic, since in the proof of the Prolongation Lemma the Extension Lemma is used and there are clauses in the definition of the extended forcing relation at k which depend on the forcing relation at the nodes k' < k.
However, it is possible to give for each formula A a number sd(A), the search depth of A, such that if d(A:) = sd(^), then for all k' < k 9 k' Ih A iff k Ih A. Therefore for each formula A we only have to search at most sd(v4) nodes below k to know in which nodes below k A is forced.
sd ( . To eliminate the arbitrariness that would result from fixing a particular proof predicate, Guaspari and Solovay allow arithmetical interpretations to be based on any "rea-sonable" proof predicate, i.e., any Σ?-numeration of the theorems of PA in PA satisfying the derivability conditions and demonstrable Σ-completeness. Such a reasonable proof predicate is called "standard".
Guaspari and Solovay actually prove that it is sufficient to allow interpretations to be based on Σ?-formulas provably equivalent to Pr(x). In [4] "standard" refers to this kind of proof predicate.
An alternative way to abstract from accidental circumstances, and the one we are going to follow, is to fix a particular proof predicate Pr(x) and allow arithmetical interpretations to be based on reasonable (pre-)permutations of the natural numbers, where a (pre-)permutation is called reasonable if Pr(x) still satisfies demonstrable Σ-completeness when the witness comparison is based on the ordering of the (pre-)permuted natural numbers. In other words, we allow arithmetical interpretations to be based on any (pre-)ordering of the natural numbers such that Pτ( r A n ) ° Pr( Γ # π )> with ° a connective for witness comparison based on the new ordering, is Σ?. At the end of this section it will be shown that for our present purposes the latter alternative is to be preferred.
Definition
Let <* be a weak pre-ordering on N and <* its associated strict pre-ordering such that Pr(x) satisfies demonstrable Σ-completeness when witness comparison is based on <* and <*. An arithmetical interpretation * of £ + based on <* is a map from formulas of <£ + to sentences of PA satisfying:
• for all atomic p, p* is an arithmetical sentence • j_* = 0 = 1; τ* = 0 = 0 • ( )* commutes with Boolean connectives
One easily verifies:
To prove the reverse implications, we define, for any tail model K and any formula A, a representation [A] κ of the set of nodes in K in which A is forced, and an arithmetical interpretation (A) κ such that the following hold:
Fix a tail model K = <ω,<,lh>.
IA^K = {k e ω:k \\-A}. Define as a formula of the language of arithmetic: 9 if IAJ K is cofinite.
By convention, the empty disjunction is J_ and the empty conjunction is T.
It is easy to see that the following holds:
PAHx£ lAH κ ++xe I-MJ*.
Definition / = lim h(n)
, where h is defined as follows:
The following lemma lists some properties of h and /. Proofs can be found in [5] .
Lemma (i) PA h "A is weakly monotonic in <"
(ii) PA h "/ exists" (iii) PA h "if I = / and i < y, then PA + "/ = j" is consistent" (iv) PA h "// / = / and i it y, then PA h "/ Φ Γ" (v) / = 0 (vi) for all /, PA + "/ = /" is consistent.
Remark
The arguments for (v) and (vi) cannot be formalized in PA. 
Definition
[A] κ = /E IA^K.
Our next problem is to find an ordering < κ on N such that there exists an arithmetical interpretation < ) κ based on
That means that we have as constraints on < ) κ :
Let Minproof(x,«) :^ Proof (x,n) Λ Vy < x -ιProof {y,n) and define MIN-PROOFS = {x:Minproof(jc, r <>l> A: n ), for some A}. (A) κ is of course dependent on < κ , the ordering we still have to define. But because (A) κ occurs at the level of codes, we can implement this innocent circularity by the recursion theorem.
We obtain our new ordering < κ by pushing the elements of MINPROOFS exactly as much forward as is needed to satisfy the above constraints. That is, we change the order of m and a larger n if and only if n is a minimal proof of (A) κ and for some /, h(i) \\-ΏA < ΏB for some B such that either m or, if m ί MINPROOFS, some p < m is a minimal proof of (B) κ .
If for some /, λ(z') Ih ΏA < ΏB Λ ΏB < ΏA, and m and n are minimal proofs of (A) κ and {B) κ respectively, then m and n will be equivalent in our new ordering. We therefore discriminate between pairs which are weakly permuted in our new ordering and those which are strictly permuted. By the recursion theorem we can define the following permutation relations of pairs which are weakly, respectively strongly, permuted: The fact that we restrict our action to the set of minimal proofs is not relevant to our present purposes. This restriction is used in [10] to derive a result of Tuttas [7] . Let us now give the formal definition of < κ and < ) κ :
(i) n < κ m^WP κ (m,n) or (n < m and not SP κ (n 9 m)) (ii) n < κ m*=> SP κ (m,n) or (n < m and not WP κ (n,m)) (iii) < ) κ is the arithmetical interpretation based on < κ induced by:
In the appendix it is proved that < κ is a weak pre-ordering and < κ is its associated strict pre-ordering.
Example
Suppose for some / that h(i) Ih ΏH-ΏC < ΏE < ΏA < ΏB < ΏD-ΏG < ΏI < ΏF and suppose that Minproof(n, Γ (Φ} κ n ) iff Φ is appended to n in the following picture: Then (1,2,... ,20) gets permuted into (l,2, [7,19],12,3,4,5,6,8,9,10,[ll,17],13, 14,20,15,16,18) .
We admit that it is not immediately clear that < ) κ is indeed an arithmetical interpretation. However, before verifying the Σ-completeness for witness comparison based on < κ , it will be convenient to show the provable equivalence of [A] κ and (A) κ :
Proof: By induction on A.
• • Suppose ^4 = ΠB < DC. Reason in PA as follows:
"<-": Suppose 3x(Proof(x, r <£>^n) f\Vy < κ x -.Proof(j, r <C>^n)). Then Pr( Γ < J β> AΓ~1 ) and, by the induction hypothesis, for some /, h{i) Ih DA But then h(i) Ih (ΠB < DC) v (DC < DA). Suppose h(i) Ih DC < DA Then h(ί) Ih DC and thus for some y Minproof(j>, Γ <C>^Π). But then y < κ x for all x such that Proof(x, Γ <B) K ' 1 ), so we would have for all x (Proof (x, r (By K~] ) -• ly < κ x Proof(j, Γ (C) K~1 )), which yields a contradiction. We conclude that h(i) Ih ΠB < DC, so by Σ-persistency, / E IAI K .
"->": Suppose / e IIΠB < ΠC^K. Then for some /, h(i) Ih ΠB < DC, and thus h(i) Ih ΠB. By the induction hypothesis, for some x Minproof(x, Γ <^>^π). Suppose 3j > < κ x Proof(y, r <C) κ n ), then for somey, h(j) Ih DC < ΠB, which yields a contradiction. So we have for some x (Proof (x, Γ <B) κ n ) Λ Vy <* X -iProof(^, Γ <C>^" 1 )).
• The case of A = ΠB < DC is similar to the one above. • >1 = Pr( Γ 5 Π ) < κ Pr( Γ C Π ): Similar.
Definition
For the reader's convenience, we give the informal considerations leading to the particular Σ? -equivalents of A given in Cases 3 and 4 of the above proof. In Case 3 we know that proofs of B may have been pushed forward, but proofs of C not. Therefore we only have to check whether there is a proofs of C in the set of numbers z below the minimal proof x of B such that not ΨP κ (z,x) . In Case 4 we know that proofs of C may have been pushed forward, but proofs of B not. So we now have to check whether there is a proof of C below the minimal proof x of B or whether the minimal proof of C is pushed before x, i.e., whether there is a proof of some (D) κ below x such that for some /, h(i) \\-ΠE < ΠD. Now we can easily derive the following: (p,n) . Thus in both subcases n < κ p.
